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On 11 March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami hit Japan’s 
Tohoku region, followed by a nuclear crisis. Many tragic – 
as well as heroic – stories have emerged from this triple dis-
aster where 15,797 people died and 3,054 are still missing 
(as of 11 April 2012). Fundamental problems at the level 
of national governance have since exacerbated the dire 
conditions on the ground. In May, two months after the 
disaster, a reformist bureaucrat Shigeaki Koga published 
Collapse of Japan’s central administration, a bestseller 
attacking the state of affairs in the ruling Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ). Most disturbing, he argued, was 
the entrenched culture of bureaucrats coordinating public 
projects that benefit the very companies they later join 
upon retirement. Anyone familiar with Japan will know 
that this problem, known as amakudari, is an entrenched 
issue that has characterized the decades-long rule of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Reforms have been diffi-
cult to implement and the disaster painfully illuminates an 
entrenched bureaucratic mindset among the political elite.
On the other hand, this crisis also shows up how resilient 
affected populations have been, and the enormous strength 
of supportive community networks. In the midst of dis-
asters of this scale, it is difficult not to give in to despair 
or resignation. Fear of lingering nuclear contamination is 
especially great in and around Fukushima, as is the chal-
lenge for fishermen in Ishinomaki, for instance, who will 
not recover should Japanese people refuse to buy their fish 
due to radiation fears.
Inadequate national leadership has hampered recovery 
and reconstruction, and generally slowed down the provi-
sion of national government aid to the devastated commu-
nities of Ishinomaki, Onagawa, Kamaishi, Rikuzen-takata, 
Kesennuma, Iwaki in Fukushima, and other towns and 
cities. Over the months following the disaster, local mayors 
took turns to complain publicly about their exasperation. 
For example, on 21 June 2011, the mayor of Iitate village, 
Norio Kanno, forced to evacuate the city office due to radi-
ation, pleaded on NHK, the Japanese national broadcast 
network, for national government to become less ‘self-
centred’ and to pay proper attention to the suffering of 
local people. At a small event on 26 June 2011, organized 
by Machida City and Aid TAKATA (an organization set 
up by local people to collect funds for the reconstruction 
of Rikuzen-takata), the mayor, who had lost his wife as 
he went to the rescue of his citizens, could not control his 
emotions, speaking with despair of the prejudice shown by 
central government towards local government.
Seven months to the day since 11 March, with central 
government still failing to put adequate plans in place for 
financing reconstruction, the mayor of Minamisanriku 
town prepared for a final attempt to petition the new prime 
minister, Yoshihiko Noda, to finance local reconstruction 
– estimated to cost 55 times the town’s annual budget – as 
the town was suffering from a 70% fall in tax revenues due 
to tax exemptions for struggling businesses. The mayor 
was allocated ten minutes with the prime minister, but 
upon arrival found that Noda was elsewhere and was left 
to plead with lower ranking officials, who gave the usual 
diplomatic answer that government would bear the cost, 
but with no indication as to when and how.
A historic change of government came about in 2009, 
partly due to promises made to break prior bureaucracy-
led LDP governments. The saga surrounding the resigna-
tion of the minister for reconstruction, Ryo Matsumoto, on 
5 July 2011 on national TV (he reprimanded, and threat-
ened to stop funding, Miyagi prefecture if its mayor did 
not get in line), further consolidated the conceptual and 
emotional gap between the political elite and the people 
on the ground.
Driven by overwhelming needs, local leaders have 
clamoured for financial help from central government. 
However, in pressing national politicians to act beyond 
their own immediate political interest, they have become 
a force for a radically new way of conducting political 
business.
Ten months after the earthquake, at a JICA/SOAS1 
sponsored event on 19 January 2012, Jin Sato from the 
Institute for Advanced Studies of Asia (Tokyo University) 
argued that recovery is measured by the extent to which 
victims draw on their own inherent knowledge and capaci-
ties. Generally, people prefer to see themselves as partners 
rather than victims, and so long as the underlying victim/
helper dichotomy prevails, this natural disaster is pro-
longed in the form of a social disaster.
Many of the larger NGOs (non-governmental organi-
zations) such as the Japanese Red Cross and the much 
smaller Peace Boat, offered much needed assistance post-
disaster, as did many other self-organizing groups, smaller 
NGOs, and NPOs (non-profit organizations). However, in 
Jin Sato’s view, help is not enough. He argued that the pri-
vate sector often makes a professional contribution which 
is better suited to getting people back on their feet than 
volunteers and charities. While volunteer groups, such as 
All Hands, do much good in clearing out houses and canals 
– as do many self-organizing NPOs – reconstruction has 
to provide a sense of psychological recovery, so that local 
people can get involved themselves and feel empowered. 
When I visited an evacuation centre in Ishinomaki, I was 
indeed struck by the way that aid was being planned 
without the involvement of local people and how aid 
workers stood out from the ‘victims’ they sought to help.
Jin Sato further suggested that much assistance has, in 
this way, focused on satisfying the feelings of the donors 
rather than the needs of the people receiving the aid. 
Many young people volunteering clearly want to help, and 
when I spoke to local people reconstructing their dam-
aged houses a year after the disaster, they expressed their 
gratitude for the volunteers who came to clean up their 
homes. However, Jin Sato also stressed how difficult it is 
to ascertain what people need, and even more difficult to 
provide aid that encourages self-motivation rather than 
despondence. Another speaker at the JICA/SOAS event, 
Kan Hiroshi Sato, highlighted the importance of hope, an 
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oft-repeated word in this crisis that, in his view, arises out 
of resilience, emerging when an individual uses his or her 
own knowledge and experience. He found that when aid 
agencies or volunteers do not know local governance or 
ways, their activities might well end up destroying local 
resilience rather than helping it.
Japan – a country lacking in social 
engagement?
Due to the scale of the devastation, few organizations were 
able to assist immediately. The Japanese Self Defence 
Forces (SDF) deployed the day after the disaster to rescue 
people stranded or buried, and continued to help in the 
months to follow. Their work was enormously appreci-
ated. At the same time, their departure was also seen as 
an opportunity for communities to stand on their own feet 
again. Apart from this, however, the central government’s 
disaster preparation was woefully inadequate.
Some local municipalities were wiped out, and local 
government often found it difficult to provide much relief 
for themselves. In many cases, local people had to take 
the initiative themselves to rescue their neighbours in 
the first few days or weeks and elderly people who were 
living alone say that it was neighbours who came to their 
aid, sometimes only minutes before the tsunami arrived. 
People also tell how they shared whatever food or other 
items they had, while some local supermarkets opened up 
spontaneously for people to help themselves to food and 
other items.
For most NGOs, NPOs and other groups, it took 3-4 
weeks to organize assistance, although Second Harvest 
and Peace Boat were already active within 10-14 days. 
Established NGOs, especially those coming from outside 
the region, were handicapped by difficulties in housing 
their volunteers.
With the mass media largely focusing on the response of 
NGOs, small NPOs, and local personalities helping others, 
there has been little or no media coverage of some of the 
most effective responses in the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster, namely from religious organizations rooted in the 
communities. For example, local temples and shrines still 
standing were quickly converted into shelters. Religious 
organizations such as Tenrikyo, drawing on its long history 
of volunteering, as well as its more recently trained and 
technically-equipped volunteers who were in possession 
of heavy machinery to remove debris, went to the stricken 
areas almost immediately to help. Meanwhile, others – 
Shinnyoen, Rissho Koseikai, and Sotozenshu – were able 
to send small groups of individuals by the second and third 
day to offer assistance. Another significant response came 
from organizations who opened up their local commu-
nity centres to evacuees, and who had local people on the 
ground where no other NGO was able to operate.
The national newspaper Asahi (10 June) argued that 
three times as many people volunteered in the first three 
months of the Great Hanshin Earthquake in Kobe in 1995 
(1,117,000 compared to the 390,000 volunteers in the 
Tohoku Earthquake). The Hanshin Earthquake was near a 
big city (Osaka) compared to the vast area of the Tohoku 
disasters – which, moreover, had no trains running, closed 
highways, insufficient petrol, and the Fukushima nuclear 
accident. However, this estimation of the number of volun-
teers did not include the local people themselves. Nor did 
it include responses from religious organizations.
Religious organizations and relief: Soka Gakkai
Having researched NGO responses to the crisis, Jin Sato 
developed a deeper interest in the question of how people 
survived, especially during the first crucial days and early 
months, when the government and many NGOs, were not 
yet fully active. Here, it was particularly religious organi-
zations and local NGOs that were most active early on in 
providing assistance at the grassroots level.
The Soka Gakkai has been the focus of my own first-hand 
research for some years. Soka Gakkai (‘Value-creation 
Society’) is a large lay Mahayana Buddhist organization in 
Japan. It has been subject to controversy and many regard 
it more as a ‘new religion’ than a Buddhist organization, 
especially since it was excommunicated from the priestly 
Nichiren Shōshū Temple in 1991 (only to continue as a lay 
organization). Because of its missionary zeal, Soka Gakkai 
has a large following in Western countries, particularly 
in the US. Outside observers look upon Soka Gakkai as 
involving a cult of personality, given its focus on Soka 
Gakkai International (SGI) President Ikeda, as well as 
the two preceding presidents (and founders) Josei Toda 
and Tsunesaburo Makiguchi. More controversially, in the 
1960s, Soka Gakkai established a political party, Komeito 
or ‘Clean Government Party’, which focuses in particular 
on social welfare, and today represents the third biggest 
party nationally, wielding considerable political influence 
(see Fisker-Nielsen 2012).
Many Soka Gakkai members who themselves fell 
victim to the earthquake and tsunami, turned ‘volunteer’ 
to offer assistance to others during those first crucial days 
and weeks. Official Soka Gakkai membership in Japan 
numbers ten million, of which maybe about 3 million are 
very active members, another 3 million active on a less 
regular basis, and the rest either active irregularly, or mem-
bers in name only. Soka Gakkai takes the Buddhist phi-
losophy and practice of the 13th century priest Nichiren 
(1222-1282) as its basis. Outsiders often assume a top-
down structure, but according to its adherents, its success 
comes from its focus on inner change (known as human 
revolution) and on social engagement, which has fostered 
many self-motivated individuals. It has long advocated the 
abolition of nuclear power and environmental protection, 
and has also engaged in cultural exchanges and develop-
ment. Individual members commonly take initiatives in 
their chosen area of work.
Whatever the controversies over its status, its organiza-
tional strength and its stronghold within the community 
mean that, along with other religious organizations, it is 
sometimes among the first to deliver emergency supplies 
and help people who, in the first few days, have to rely on 
themselves and neighbourhood relations (e.g. in Rikuzen-
takata or Ishinomaki). With the exception of Soka Gakkai’s 
own newspapers, its efficacy on this front has not gener-
ally been recognized in the mass media, even though it 
took most NGOs at least two weeks to facilitate effective 
relief. Of course, religious organizations can be contro-
versial, particularly if they are seen to engage in the relief 
effort as a means to religious proselytizing. However, a 
taboo on publishing about religious organizations rooted 
in 20th century Japanese history, helps to obscure the issue 
of local assistance during national disasters of this kind 
(see Hardacre 2003).
Although Japan is often seen as having a weak civil 
society with strong state ‘managed’ groups (Garon 1997), 
earthquakes seem to have contributed to altering this situ-
ation to some degree. Pekkanan (2000) for instance, notes 
how the Hanshin Earthquake generated a proliferation of 
charities and NGOs in Japan. Similarly, Soka Gakkai’s 
preparedness for dealing with natural disasters improved 
after the earthquake in Kobe in 1995. At the time of the 
Hanshin Earthquake, Soka Gakkai also found itself par-
ticipating in rescue, relief and recovery. These activities 
were based on its existing grassroots network and organi-
zational capacity. Since then, it has created more solid con-
tingency plans such as stocking up on emergency supplies 
in Tokyo and Osaka, having a satellite phone system with 
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priority telephone lines, and private power generation sys-
tems that would enable communication should power fail.
Estimated to have reached a ‘9’ on the Richter Scale, 
the earthquake in Tohoku hit at 14:46: by 16:15 a central 
emergency communication centre had been organized at 
the Soka Gakkai headquarters in Tokyo, which communi-
cated with the main Soka Gakkai Tohoku Centre in Sendai, 
the nearest big city to the epicentre. Meanwhile other Soka 
Gakkai groups – members in Hokkaido, Niigata and Kobe 
who had all experienced big earthquakes and tsunami in 
recent years – immediately put together emergency sup-
plies and prepared to dispatch them to Iwate, one of the 
affected prefectures. They then reported to the headquar-
ters in Tokyo. Without waiting for instructions from the 
national organization and without knowing if roads would 
be open, trucks loaded with emergency goods headed for 
Tohoku that same evening. Thus, rather than waiting for a 
centralized command, the initiative for action came swiftly 
from the local level, which continues to be the case today.
Many Soka Gakkai centres were turned into evacua-
tion shelters. Forty-two such centres exist in Tohoku. One 
was a pre-designated government emergency facility, but 
the rest opened up to everyone, irrespective of whether 
they were Soka Gakkai. At the peak, just after the dis-
aster, there were 5000 evacuees at these centres around 
Tohoku. Local Soka Gakkai leaders were also checking on 
people affected in the neighbourhoods and delivering sup-
plies where they could, to those still in their homes. This 
involved addressing a number of logistical challenges, 
such as the provision of water, toilets and the preparation 
of 15,000 meals a day. Shinichiro Miyachi, a journalist 
from the Soka Gakkai daily newspaper describes the situ-
ation in the Tohoku main Soka Gakkai centre:
‘I was interviewing a person in Sendai when the earthquake 
happened. The transportation and mobile phones stopped, the 
city was in chaos, the shops closed, and I think even most of the 
police boxes (kōban) closed. We could not ascertain what kind 
of disaster had happened. It was impossible to return to Tokyo, 
so I decided to go to the Soka Gakkai Tohoku Cultural Centre.’ 
(interview with author, 16 June 2011).
He arrived in the evening, finding about 400 people 
from the neighbourhood taking refuge along with 30-40 
staff, themselves also evacuees. Water and gas supplies 
were disrupted, and there was not enough food for that 
many people. The Soka Gakkai women members cooked 
and prepared rice balls throughout the night, using the cen-
tre’s own power generator. Akihiko Morishima, the Soka 
Gakkai leader of Miyagi, himself an evacuee and unaware 
of what had happened to his own family or house, procured 
blankets and food from local shops. ‘Here in Tokyo we 
wanted reports on what was going on so we could help’, 
Hirotsugu Terasaki, the director of the Public Information 
Office in Tokyo says laughingly, ‘but the Gakkai staff in 
Sendai got really upset, and told us, “we are here at the 
forefront of the disaster and you go on about getting these 
stupid reports.” But really, we wanted to know what was 
most needed.’ (interview with author, 15 June 2011).
Although supplies were quickly on their way, the imme-
diate challenge on the ground was to restore essential ser-
vices. ‘When the water stops’, Miyachi explains ‘it has 
an immediate effect on such essentials as food and toilets. 
With more people streaming in by the minute, this was 
difficult.’ They used temporary toilets, of which they had 
1,000 in stock for an emergency. For the first five days, 24 
hours-a-day, the young women evacuees organized them-
selves in teams to show people how to use these toilets. 
This kind of organization was not part of any contingency 
plan, but arose on the spot.
Soka Gakkai members are accustomed to organizing 
events with large groups of people, and in communicating 
and making comparatively quick decisions. Regular Soka 
Gakkai activities include participation in discussion meet-
ings and involvement in organizing events, which means 
that members are generally used to speaking in front of 
large groups of people and playing leadership roles. The 
value of quick decision-making to minimize fatigue and 
confusion is what Jin Sato of the Institute of Advanced 
Studies of Asia has identified as crucial for running evacu-
ation centres.
During my first trip to Tohoku in June 2011, three 
months after the disaster, I discovered how Soka Gakkai 
relief efforts went some way towards addressing the 
already mentioned victim/helper dichotomy. For example, 
a young man I was travelling with (one of over 1,000 Soka 
Gakkai staff sent to the region on ten-day shifts to help 
clean up) explicitly warned me to avoid making people 
feel ‘helped’. Japanese have a strong sense of obligation, 
which causes them to suffer even more if they cannot 
return a favour done for them. I was reminded of this 
again during my visit in April 2012, when a Soka Gakkai 
member, himself interviewed several times by the mass 
media amidst the devastation of his house and company, 
also criticized the way media portrayed local people either 
as victims or heroes, asserting that all find themselves in 
the same situation together.
The day after the earthquake, with 1,000 people now 
present, Miyachi remembers, ‘I was supposed to go to 
Sendai for one day, and I just had the suit I was wearing. 
For ten days, I slept and did relief activities in that suit. At 
the same time, I also tried to write articles for the news-
paper. I continued writing and taking photos as I helped 
carrying boxes or whatever. After ten days I returned to 
Tokyo once, and then came back to Tohoku a few days 
later to continue to help.’
Rice balls made during the first few days by Soka 
Gakkai women in neighbouring Niigata were dispatched 
to six main Soka Gakkai centres in Tohoku along with 
thousands of other emergency supplies. Upon arrival, 
members would distribute essentials to other emergency 
shelters including government-run ones, sometimes on 
bicycles, sometimes by car. Within the first two days, they 
had created a distribution system. Making use of a pro-
fessional transport company to get the goods to the main 
centres, Soka Gakkai sent 650,000 emergency items in the 
first month and a half.2
Thousands thus survived by turning to Soka Gakkai 
centres converted into evacuation shelters, where vic-
tims of the tsunami themselves worked as volunteers. 
For instance, a centre in Ishinomaki took in about 150 
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1. Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency and 
the School of Oriental and 
African Studies.
2. 60,000 portable toilets, 
24,000 items of clothing, 
4,700 blankets, futons and 
bed linen, 243,000 items of 
daily necessities, 296,000 
food items, 40,600 medical 
supplies and 33,400 other 
commodities such as fuel, 
blood pressure gauges, 
bicycles, whiteboards, 
washing machines, dryers, 
kettles, portable cooking 
stoves, and gas cartridges.
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floor. After working to provide food and relief, on the 
second day, Soka Gakkai leaders in Ishinomaki registered 
it as an evacuation centre at the municipal office, though 
one week went by before the first SDF personnel came to 
enquire what they needed. Drinking water was the most 
urgent requirement. By that time, they had received sup-
plies through neighbouring Soka Gakkai groups, distrib-
uted by volunteer members, while a local member had 
been delivering water in a large tank to flush the toilets.
By June, most of those who had taken refuge had 
been relocated to public evacuation centres or temporary 
housing, or had returned home.
Taking leadership in the evacuation shelters
Soka Gakkai members describe their practice as ‘training 
in caring for others’; their default position in a situation of 
crisis. ‘Of course we never thought there would be such a 
disaster,’ one Soka Gakkai leader explains, ‘but somehow 
we instinctively drew on what we have learned from our 
daily Buddhist practice, which is based on Nichiren’s phi-
losophy and Mr Ikeda’s encouragement to respond to any 
situation with courage, focusing on the person right in 
front of us.’
In Onagawa, where 70-80% of the town was destroyed, 
there is an evacuation centre, filled to capacity with very 
little personal space. While the media reports orderly 
queues, everyone is actually on edge, having lost family 
members and everything they owned. Further anxiety 
builds up over the lack of vision for the future and verbal 
fights easily break out, as one evacuee recalls. The Soka 
Gakkai leader of Onagawa also lives in this evacuation 
centre. Everyone knows him, as he offers encouragement 
to others whilst distributing the Seikyo newspaper which, 
though usually focusing on Soka Gakkai activities, during 
the disaster contained substantial information about the 
situation in Tohoku. In some evacuation centres, it was the 
only source of news for the first few weeks. If mainstream 
newspapers had difficulties in distribution, the local Soka 
Gakkai members who normally delivered Seikyo newspa-
pers continued to do so. The paper carried many experi-
ences from survivors.
Soka Gakkai regard leaders who themselves have expe-
rienced natural disasters – people from Kobe for instance 
– as able to offer the best kind of encouragement to those 
now affected. Listening to people who had lost everything 
themselves, sharing how they overcame the same profound 
suffering, was one way to offer the hope that the capacity 
to overcome their sufferings lay within themselves.
Buddhism and social engagement
Unlike the accounts of earthquakes in early Japanese his-
tory, in this case, there has been very little, or no, discus-
sion of bad karma or punishment from ‘above’ by any 
of the Buddhist sects. In fact, this question seems to be 
regarded as inconsequential. Soka Gakkai experience 
Buddhism as a life philosophy and way of being in the 
world which is in some ways closer to everyday life than 
the more established Japanese Buddhism which typically 
focuses on funeral rites. Buddhist practice here involves 
maintaining a constructive forward-looking attitude and 
trying to encourage others to do the same. This is generally 
regarded as involving a spiritual transformation.
Soka Gakkai members remind themselves of Nichiren 
and his struggles in 13th century Japan. One of his most 
famous writings, a text most people in Japan will have 
heard of, is On establishing the correct teaching for peace 
of the land (1260). Written at a time when Japan was 
facing a number of natural and social disasters, Nichiren 
proclaimed these the outcome of incorrect teachings and 
ways of thinking. Yet, the meaning he attached to this 
changed over time: from a focus on avoiding slander of 
the Buddhist Dharma to emphasizing opportunities for the 
propagation of the Dharma. ‘Dharma’, or ‘Law’ here indi-
cates principles or values by which people try to live.
For the last few decades in particular, Daisaku Ikeda, as 
the long-term spiritual leader of Soka Gakkai, has empha-
sized that propagation of the ‘Law’ refers not simply to the 
narrow goal of propagating a particular sect, although that 
is clearly part of it, but the wider objective of cultivating 
societal values that correspond with the principles of 
human dignity and selfless care for others. Ikeda’s reading 
of Nichiren stresses that Nichiren admonished leaders – 
political and otherwise – when they were not working on 
behalf of the people. This is, more controversially, linked 
to Soka Gakkai’s support for its own political party.
At the local level in Japan, the individual is normally 
understood as standing in the way of collective national, 
political or economic interests. This is increasingly seen as 
political rhetoric devoid of substance which caters to elite 
interests. The Tohoku disaster has prompted people to ask 
what the ruling party did, with their majority of more than 
400 lawmakers, when they could have responded with 
much more urgency and political will than they did. This 
opportunity to focus on the need for a transformation in 
political culture is not lost on religious organizations at 
the forefront of the relief efforts for this disaster, including 
the Soka Gakkai. They also do not hesitate to use this to 
score political points. However, as elsewhere, this disaster 
has equally highlighted a gap within Soka Gakkai itself, as 
there is a quiet murmuring from youth leaders that Komeito 
national politicians are too involved in their world of elite 
political diplomacy. The disaster in Japan has therefore 
had two major impacts: first, an impetus on the part of the 
government and of political parties (religious groups and 
NGOs were fairly well-prepared) to plan better for future 
disasters, and second, an impetus towards addressing the 
gaps between elite political interests and issues that relate 
to ordinary people’s lives across the spectrum of all polit-
ical parties. The crescendo of voices calling for reform and 
improved planning is likely to prove a major challenge for 
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